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Abstract
This paper shows how the welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination may be
decomposed into two effects: a misallocation effect and an output effect. It also presents a
geometrical analysis which shows how the welfare properties of third-degree price
discrimination must be assessed using nonlinear demands, and hence how linear demands are
not suitable for the analysis.
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Price discrimination under imperfect competition is an important area of economic re-
search both theoretically and empirically.1 This paper is concerned with third-degree price
discrimination, which "is a major item under the rubric special topics in any standard
neoclassical treatment of monopoly theory" (Battalio and Ekelund, 1972). Despite its
importance, however, not much is known about the welfare e⁄ects of this type of price
discrimination. One of the aspects that is known, for instance, although rarely explicitly
showed, is that a move from uniform pricing to third-degree price discrimination generates
two e⁄ects:2 ￿rst, price discrimination causes a misallocation of goods from high to low
value users (that is, output is not e¢ ciently distributed to the highest-value end) and, sec-
ond, price discrimination a⁄ects total output. Therefore, as price discrimination is viewed
as an ine¢ cient way of distributing a given quantity of output between di⁄erent consumers
or submarkets, a necessary condition for price discrimination to increase social welfare is
that it increases total output.3 Put di⁄erently, in order for price discrimination to increase
welfare a positive output e⁄ect should o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of the distributional in-
e¢ ciency. As a result a focal point of analysis in the literature has been the analysis of
the e⁄ects of price discrimination on output.4 It is known from Pigou (1920) that under
linear demands price discrimination does not change output.5 Therefore, given that the
output e⁄ect is zero, the case of linear demands, although it presents obvious analytical
advantages, is not suitable for decomposing the welfare change into the two e⁄ects. In the
general non-linear case, however, the e⁄ect of price discrimination on output may be either
positive or negative.
This paper shows how the e⁄ect of third-degree price discrimination on social welfare
may easily broken down into the two e⁄ects, a misallocation e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect,
for the general case in which a monopolist sells a good in n perfectly separated markets.
Further, the paper illustrates the usefulness of this decomposition by using a graphical
representation and a numerical example. In particular, it considers one demand structure
which even though it was already considered by Robinson (1933) it has been rarely used to
explain price discrimination: namely we shall assume that all the strong markets (markets
where the optimal discriminatory price exceeds the optimal single price) have concave
demands whereas the weak markets (where the optimal discriminatory prices are lower
than the single price) have convex demands, with at least one market with strict concavity
or convexity. Under these circumstances third-degree price discrimination always increases
total output, and therefore the comparison between the misallocation e⁄ect and the output
e⁄ect is more interesting. Further, from an empirical perspective Robinson (1933) considers
this case more realistic than the linear case.
1See Stole (2007) and Armstrong (2006) for excellent recent theoretical surveys, and Verboven (2006)
for a review of recent empirical studies.
2Ippolito (1980), Schmalensee (1981) and Layson (1988) study this aspect. This paper generalizes and
complements their analysis.
3See, for example, Robinson (1933), Schmalensee (1981), Varian (1985), Schwartz (1990) and more
recently Bertoletti (2004).
4Since Robinson (1933) many papers have addressed this issue, including Edwards (1950), Schmalensee
(1981), Shih, Mai and Liu (1988) and Cheung and Wang (1994), among others.
5It is assumed that all markets are served under both pricing regimes, uniform pricing and price dis-
crimination.
12 Analysis
Consider a monopolist selling a good in n perfectly separated markets. The demand
function in market i (i = 1;:::;n) is given by Di(pi), where pi is the price charged in
that market and the inverse demand function is pi(qi), where qi is the quantity sold. Unit
cost, c, is assumed to be constant.
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i(pi)pi]=Di(pi) is the price-elasticity in market i. That is, the Lerner index in each
market is inversely proportional to its elasticity of demand and the monopolist, therefore,
sets a higher price in the market with the lower elasticity of demand. The quantity sold in
market i is qd




Under unifom pricing, the optimal policy is given by (p0 ￿ c)=p0 = 1="(p0), where p0
denotes the uniform price and "(p0) is the elasticity of the aggregate demand at p0. If we let
D(p) =
Pn
i=1 Di(p) denote the aggregate demand, then this elasticity is simply the weighted
average elasticity: "(p0) =
Pn
i=1 ￿i(p0)"i(p0), where the elasticity of market i is weighted




i denote the quantity sold in market i, q0
i = Di(p0) (i = 1;:::;n), and Q0 denote
the total output, Q0 =
Pn
i=1 Di(p0), under uniform pricing.












that is, the change in welfare is the sum across markets of the cumulative di⁄erence between
price and marginal cost for each market between the output under single pricing and
the output under price discrimination.6 Two types of markets are distinguished: strong
markets and weak markets. The set of strong markets collects markets where the optimal
discriminatory price exceeds the optimal single price, that is S = fi=pd
i > p0g, and the set
of weak markets consists of those where the optimal discriminatory prices are lower than
the single price, W = fi=pd





















where s 2 S denotes the representative strong market and w 2 W the representative weak
markets. As output decreases in each strong market and increases in each weak market, the
￿rst term in (2) is the aggregate welfare loss across strong markets, whereas the second term
is the aggregate welfare gain across weak markets. It is useful to distinguish a submarket
w (for example, it might be the market with the highest elasticity demand) from other
weak markets, so we can express the change in welfare as:
6As is standard in the literature, it is considered the case of quasilinear-utility function, with an aggre-
gate utility function of the form
Pn
i=1[ui(qi)+yi], where qi is the consumption in submarket i and yi is the
amount to be spent on other consumption goods, i = 1;::;n. It is assumed that u
0
i(:) > 0 and u
00





































w2W￿fwg ￿qw and ￿qi = qd
i ￿q0
i, i = 1;::;n. It is

















w￿￿Q￿w cdz. Without loss of generality, it is assumed that ￿Q￿w < 0.
Note that when output increases with price discrimination it must occur that ￿Q =
￿qw + ￿Q￿w > 0. Taking into account that qd
i = q0
i + ￿qi and pi(qi) = u
0
i(qi), i = 1;::;n,









































Given that ￿Q￿w = ￿Qs+￿Qw￿fwg and taking into account that the optimal uniform






w), s 2 S and w 2 W, we can express the change in welfare
as:
￿W = ME + OE, (5)































































The misallocation e⁄ect, ME, is always negative and represents the welfare loss due to
the misallocation of goods from high to low value users. It corresponds with the social loss
due to the transfer of j￿Qsj =
￿ ￿P
s2S ￿qs
￿ ￿ units of production from the strong markets to
3the weak markets. The two-market case may be lighting up given that the misallocation





the misallocation e⁄ect might be interpreted as the welfare loss due to the transfer of units
of production from the strong market (market 1) to the weak market (market 2). The
output e⁄ect, OE, can be interpreted as the e⁄ect of additional output on social welfare.
Obviously, if the quantity e⁄ect is positive, ￿Q = ￿qw + ￿Q￿w > 0, the output e⁄ect
on social welfare is positive because the social valuation of the increase in output exceeds
the marginal social cost. Note that given that the misallocation e⁄ect is always negative,
a necessary, but of course not su¢ cient, condition for third-degree price discrimination to
increase social welfare is an increase in total output. Note from (5), therefore, that the
linear-demand case is not suitable to illustrate the two e⁄ects of price discrimination on
social welfare, given that the output e⁄ect is zero. The following example illustrates how
the misallocation e⁄ect and the output e⁄ect can be di⁄erentiated.
Example
Assume that the demand functions are given by D1(p1) = (1 ￿ p1)
1
2, D2(p2) = (1 ￿ p2)
and D3(p3) = (1￿p3)2 and unit cost is c = 0:1. Discriminatory prices are p￿
1 = 0:7 > p￿
2 =
0:55 > p￿
3 = 0:4 and the uniform price is p0 = 0:578. The strong market, market 1, has
strictly concave demand, and there are two weak markets: market 2 has linear demand
and market 3 (the most elastic) has strictly convex demand. When all weak markets have
strictly convex demands (D
00
w > 0) or linear and all the strong markets strictly concave
demands (D
00
w < 0) then price discrimination increases total output.7 A move from uniform
pricing to price discrimination generates the following changes in output: ￿q1 = ￿0:101,
￿q2 = 0:028, ￿q3 = 0:181 and ￿Q￿3 = ￿q1+￿q2 = ￿0:073. Note that price discrimination
increases total output ￿Q = ￿Q￿3+￿q3 = 0:108. The misallocation e⁄ect and the output
e⁄ect are given by ME = ￿0:009 and OE = 0:037. Therefore, given that the output e⁄ect
is greater than the misallocation e⁄ect, OE > jMEj, price discrimination increases social
welfare, ￿W = 0:027.
Figure 1 shows the welfare e⁄ect of third-degree price discrimination and its decompo-
sition into the misallocation e⁄ect, which is the sum of the red areas, and the output e⁄ect,
which is represented by the blue area.8 As in the numerical example, the ￿gure shows a
case which the output e⁄ect is greater than the misallocation e⁄ect.
The decomposition of the change in social welfare into two e⁄ects, a misallocation e⁄ect
and an output e⁄ect, depends on the choice of submarket w which we have interpreted, for
instance, as the market with the highest elasticity demand. We have de￿ned the output
e⁄ect as the social valuation of an increase in output: therefore, we follow the convention
to evaluate the increase in production according to the preferences of the consumers in
the more weak market. Other convention would a⁄ect the relative importance of the
misallocation e⁄ect in comparison with the output e⁄ect but the change in social welfare
would maintain unaltered.
7See, for example, Robinson (1933), Edwards (1950), Schmalensee (1981) or Shih, Mai and Liu (1988).
8Other interesting geometrical analysis can be found in Robinson (1933), Battalio and Ekelund (1972),
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Figure 1. Price discrimination and welfare: output and misallocation e⁄ects.
3 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some implications of the above analysis from a theoretical per-
spective and from an empirical point of view.
3.1 Theoretical considerations
Schmalensee (1981) stated that when the demands of submarkets are all concave or convex
then total output, and therefore welfare, may either increase or decrease. Shih et al.
(1988) and Cheung and Wang (1994) address partially this problem of indeterminacy.
Their analysis, however, is far for complete, since they are unable to explain, for example,
why under constant elasticity demands third-degree price discrimination always increases
total output. Aguirre (2007) shows that when both marklets have strictly concave (convex)
demands a su¢ cient (necessary) condition for price discrimination to increase total output
is that the demand of the strong market is more concave than the demand of the weak
market. Along this line of research, Cowan (2007) analyzes the welfare e⁄ects of third
degree price discrimination when demand in one market is a shifted version of demand in
the other market. He assumes that demand is Q = a+bq(p) where a ￿ 0, b > 0 and q(p) is
the underlying demand function. He shows that the welfare e⁄ect of price discrimination
is negative if discriminatory welfare, as a function of the shift factor, is concave and that
two su¢ cient conditions for concavity are that the slope of demand is log-concave and the
convexity of demand is non-decreasing in the price. Since all demand functions commonly
used in models of imperfect competition satisfy one or both of these conditions, and given
that the conditions for price discrimination to raise welfare are rather stringent in his
model, Cowan (2007) concludes that "the expectation is that discrimination will reduce
welfare". Therefore, if demand are a¢ ne transformations one to another then it should
5be expected that third-degree price discrimination yield a welfare loss. Put di⁄erently, the
output e⁄ect (that in the Cowan context may be even negative) does not o⁄set the negative
e⁄ect of the distributional ine¢ ciency. However, although very interesting, the analysis of
Cowan seems restrictive. The following two examples illustrate how the output e⁄ect may
be positive and potentially dominate the misallocation e⁄ect when all markets have strict
convex demands or strict concave demands.
A) Constant elasticity demand curves
Assume that the demand function in market i (i = 1;2) is given by Di(pi) = aip
￿"i
i ,
where ai is a positive parameter and "2 > "1 > 1 is the elasticity of demand. Third-degree
price discrimination always increases total ouput with this kind of demands.9 This result
constrasts with that of Cowan (2007): he obtains the result that when the underlying de-
mand function is iso-elastic output and, therefore, welfare decreases. It should be pointed
out that under iso-elastic demands the demand of the strong market is a concave trans-






"2 > 0; ￿
0 > 0 and ￿
00
< 0. Given that the output e⁄ect is positive this fam-
ily of demands is appropriate to analyze the trade-o⁄ between output and misallocation
e⁄ects.
B) Constant adjusted concavity demand curves
Shih et al. (1988) propose the following class of constant adjusted-concavity demand
curves: pi = ai￿biq
A+1








= A is the Robinson￿ s
adjusted-concavity term. Shih et al. (1988) shows that when A > 0 (that is, with strictly
concave demand curves) price discrimination reduces output. Note that weak markets
have more demand concavity than strong markets. It is easy to ￿nd examples where this
result is reversed. For example, assume that the inverse demand functions are given by
p1 = 1 ￿ q4
1 and p1 = 1 ￿ q2
1. Note that the demand in submarket 1 is a strictly concave
transformation of the demand in submarket: D1(p) = ￿(D2(p)), with ￿
0 > 0 and ￿
00
< 0.
Price discrimination increases total output: ￿q1 = ￿0:046, ￿q2 = 0:065 and ￿q = 0:019.
3.2 Empirical implications
In section 2, we have argued that the case in which all the strong markets have concave
demands and the weak markets convex demands, with at least one market with strict
concavity or convexity, is more interesting that the linear case. Under these conditions
third-degree price discrimination increases total output, and therefore the comparison be-
tween the misallocation e⁄ect and the output e⁄ect is more meaningful. From an empirical
perspective Robinson (1933) also considers this case more interesting and more realistic.
Of course, the shape of the demands in the di⁄erent submarkets is entirely an empirical
question. Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge there are no studies in the literature
analyzing the relation between price elasticity and curvature of the submarkets demand.10
9Formby, Layson and Smith (1983), using Lagrange techniques, demonstrated that monopolistic price
discrimination increases output over a wide range of constant elasticities. Aguirre (2006) provides a more
general and simple proof by using the Bernoulli inequality. Cowan and Vickers (2007) provide an easier
proof.
10This aspect, however, has been analyzed in some general equilibrium macro models. Recent works
introduce a kinked demand curve as a way to obtain real rigidities in order to explain the failure of nominal
frictions to generate persistent e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks. Dossche et al. (2006), for instance, use
scanner data from a large euro area supermarket chain in search of empirical evidence on the existence
6The analysis of Acquaye and Traxler (2005) provide some empirical evidence on the
Robinson￿ s conjecture. They use data from Hubbell et al. (2000) to examine the case of
potential price discrimination in Bt cotton. Hubbell et al. present the Bt cotton demand of
cotton growers considering two regions: Upper South (Noth Carolina and South Carolina)
and Lower South (Alabama and Georgia) with di⁄erent levels of insect resistance to pes-
ticides and therefore with two derived demand curves. The total Bt cotton seed demand
for the region comprises the Upper South with no resistance experience (US/NR) and the
Lower South with some resistence experience (LS/R). Demand for Bt cotton is less elastic
when insects are resistant to chemical pesticides. Acquaye and Traxler use the demand
curves for US/NR and LS/R from Hubbell et al. (2000) and determine the e⁄ects of price
discrimination on quantities, prices and welfare. They ￿nd that price discrimination would
result in an increase in total output and welfare.11 Figure 2 (which is based on the Fig.
1 in Acquaye and Traxler) shows the decomposition of the change in welfare into output
and misallocation e⁄ects. The initial situation is that under uniform pricing the monop-
olist states of 32$/acre, selling quantitites a and b in the two markets (with a marginal
cost of about $16.88/acre). Following Acquaye and Traxler￿ s computations, under price
discrimination the price in the more elastic market (US/NR) would decrease (to point c,
about $25.92/acre) and the quantity would increase while the price in the less elastic mar-
ket (LS/R) would increase (point d, about $33.09/acre) and the quantity would decrease.
Price discrimination would then increase welfare because the positive output e⁄ect (blue
area) would o⁄set the negative e⁄ect of the distributional ine¢ ciency (red areas). (See
Table 2 in Acquaye and Traxler).
4 Concluding remarks
Understanding the welfare e⁄ects of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination is at
the heart of much theoretical and empirical research concerning price discrimination under
imperfect competition and also an important issue for public policy since policy towards
price discrimination should be based on good economic knowledge of markets. This paper
shows how the welfare e⁄ects of third-degree price discrimination may be decomposed into
two e⁄ects: a misallocation e⁄ect and an output e⁄ect. It also presents a geometrical
analysis which is valuable to illustrate the advantage of using nonlinear demands, instead
of linear demands, in order to understand the welfare properties of third-degree price
discrimination.
of the kinked demand curve and on the size of its curvature. Their results are taken to support the
introduction of a kinked (concave) demand curve in macro models. Unfortunately, however, their analysis
does not provide information concerning the relationship between the elasticity of demand and curvature
of strong markets in comparison with weak markets.
11Acquaye and Traxler (2005) make an exercise of simulation. In the Bt cotton case, the fact that the
innovator (Monsanto) was not price discriminating at the time the data for that study were collected may
have been due to the di¢ culty in preventing arbitrage between markets.











Figure 2. Output and misallocation e⁄ects due to price discrimination of Bt cotton seed
in Southern US. Note. Based on the graphical analysis by Acquaye and Traxler (2005,
Figure 1). (TF: Technology fee $/acre).
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